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Abstract 
This paper builds a theory about electoral discourse in Africa and the salience of political issues 
since the return of competitive elections in the early 1990s, based on empirical materials from 
recent elections in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal, six roughly similar 
semi-democratic francophone states in West Africa, which have conducted a least one 
reasonably free and fair election since the early 1990s. Drawing on content analysis from 
newspapers, the electronic press, party websites, as well as interviews and secondary sources 
on elections in these countries, we formulate two empirical arguments; first, issues do in fact 
captivate and potentially mobilize African voters. Our survey of the subregion suggests that 
politics is more substantive than generally credited.  Second, however, we argue that political 
parties in the subregion fail to mobilize citizens along many of these issues, for two primary 
reasons.  First, we hypothesize that the shared values and identities of political actors emerging 
during third wave transitions in the region shaped conceptions of what constitutes democratic 
politics.  For the most part, the world view of Francophone, secular, elites have come to 
dominate political discourse, restricting the types of issues that could be incorporated into 
formal politics.  Secondly, we employ the concept of issue-ownership to explain why opposition 
parties have difficulty mobilizing voters with programmatic rhetoric, and shy away from other 
issues, despite their vote-mobilizing potential.  
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Parties and Issues in Francophone West Africa: Towards a Theory of Non-
Mobilization1
 
 
Introduction 
Reforming Mali’s national Family Code has long been on the agenda of western donors, 
women’s associations and NGOs in Bamako.  On 3 August 2009, the Malian Assembly 
passed the law with a vote of 117 for the bill, five against, and four abstentions.  Its 
statutes establish a legal age of marriage, regulate inheritance, and require state-
sanctioned marriage.  Deputies raised few objections about the more than 1,100 articles 
in the code.  Opposition parties had not included the Family Code in their party 
platforms or talking points.   They were apparently not prepared for the massive 
opposition to the Code that soon erupted.  On 9 August, the head of the High Council on 
Islam, convened a meeting attended by 2,000 people at Bamako’s “Grande Mosque.” 
The following weekend, approximately 10,000 protesters took to the streets in one of 
the country’s biggest public demonstrations since democratization in the early 1990s.  
On 22 August, the first day of Ramadan, Islamic associations organized a rally of some 
50,000 people, which filled the national soccer stadium and spilled out into the streets.  
In the face of this spectacle, the major political parties remained silent.2
 
  
Why had no political party sought to mobilize political support on the basis of the 
apparently widespread opposition to the new family code?  This paper examines the 
problematic relationship between political parties and issues in West Africa.   A 
longstanding conventional wisdom among scholars argues that contemporary electoral 
politics in Africa lack substantive issues.   The recent literature suggests two distinct 
arguments in this vein.  On the one hand, party competition in the region is said to be 
about personalities and the delivery of material benefits to one’s ethnic group.  A large 
literature emphasizes the role of ethnicity in shaping party systems in the region.3  Some 
scholars have compared elections in the region to a census on cultural identity, in which 
a voter’s ethnicity or race largely explains voting, and parties serve to register these 
ethno-racial blocs, rather than mobilize voters around substantive issues.4  A recent 
paper by Bratton and Kimenyi suggests a more sophisticated approach in which parties’ 
ethnic appeals coexist with issue-based appeals to shape voting decisions, but theirs is a 
minority view.5
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Isaline Bergamaschi,  Dennis Galvan, Mamoudou Gazibo, John Gerring, 
Michelle Kuenzi, Cédric Mayrargue, Birame Ndao, Danielle Resnick, Daniel Smith, and Leonardo 
Villalon for their useful comments. All remaining flaws are, of course, our own. 
  For their part, a number of country case studies have described 
elections as largely devoid of debate, and consisting largely of folkloric events in which 
2  For reporting on the vote and protests: Diallo, A. ‘Assemblée nationale’‘(L’Essor August 5, 2009); 
Coulibaly et al, ‘Mahmoud Dicko’(Le Republicain  August 11, 2009); and Coulibaly, B. ‘Code des 
personnes et de la famille’  (Soir de Bamako, August 31, 2009) 
3 Mozaffar et al, ‘Electoral Institutions’,;  Erdmann,  ‘Party Research’:  
4 Ferree, ‘Explaining South Africa’s Racial Census’; Ottaway, ‘Ethnic Politics in Africa’; Chabal and 
Daloz, Africa Works  
5 ‘Voting in Kenya’ 
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candidates and their parties attract voters through various material promises as well as 
small amounts of cash, t-shirts and bags of rice.6  Others, finally, have largely reduced 
Africa elections to vote buying and various violent threats. 7
 
 
On the other hand, other observers have noted that explicitly programmatic parties 
have not performed well in the region.8
 
  There are no successful labor parties in the 
region defending the interests of an organized working class.  Parties with names 
suggesting support for the working class or for socialist ideas are common, of course, 
but their political rhetoric is rarely meaningfully programmatic. In contrast to both 
Europe and Latin America, no Christian Democracy tradition exists in Sub Saharan Africa, 
despite the large proportion of voters who are regular members of various Christian 
churches.  
Accounts of politics in French West Africa provide many examples of vote buying and 
various kinds of handouts to individuals and to local football teams, by the candidates of 
different parties, whose policy platforms are vague and anodyne.  African elections 
generally fail to include political debate about the macro-economic policy negotiations 
many governments are undertaking with the International Monetary Fund.  Just as 
clearly, African political parties are not easily placed on a traditional left-right spectrum.  
The policy differences which define them rarely appear to be about ideological issues 
relating to the economy or the role of the state within the economy.  One cannot link 
the party systems across the region to the kind of historical cleavages that helped to 
define political parties in Western Europe early in its own democratic history as 
memorably analyzed by Lipset and Rokkan, and which have proved remarkably resilient, 
even as new issues have come dominate and inspire the formation of new parties. 9
 
  
This paper builds a theory about electoral discourse in Africa and the salience of political 
issues since the return of competitive elections in the early 1990s, based on empirical 
materials from recent elections in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, and 
Senegal, six roughly similar semi-democratic francophone states in West Africa, which 
have conducted a least one reasonably free and fair election since the early 1990s.10
                                                 
6 Banegas, ‘Marchandisation du vote’, ;Bierschenck, ‘The local appropriation of democracy’; Marcus 
and Ratsimbaharison, ‘Political Parties in Madagascar’ 
 All 
six have similar presidential constitutions and electoral systems, so that institutional 
7 Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes; Bratton, ‘Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns’; 
Basedau et al, Votes, Money and Violence; But see Buijtenhuijs for an early contrary view, “Les Partis 
Politiques Africains’;  
8 van de Walle and Butler, Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa’s Illiberal Democracies; Salih, 
African Political Parties  
9 Erdmann, ‘Party Research’; Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies; Lipset and Rokkan, 
‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments’ 
10 Each country achieved a Freedom House rating of four or less on political and civil liberties at least 
once since 1991.  Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Chad, and Togo failed to achieve this minimum threshold 
and are excluded from our analysis. 
3 
 
factors can be viewed as constant in the analysis that follows. Drawing on content 
analysis from newspapers, the electronic press, party websites, as well as interviews and 
secondary sources on elections in these countries, we formulate two empirical 
arguments; first, as suggested by the anecdote above regarding the Family Code, issues 
do in fact captivate and potentially mobilize African voters. Our survey of the subregion 
suggests that politics is more substantive than generally credited.   
 
Second, however, we argue that political parties in the subregion fail to mobilize citizens 
along most of these issues, for two primary reasons.  First, we hypothesize that the 
shared values and identities of political actors emerging during third wave transitions in 
the region shaped conceptions of what constitutes democratic politics.  For the most 
part, the world view of Francophone, secular, elites have come to dominate political 
discourse, restricting the types of issues that could be incorporated into formal politics.  
Secondly, we employ the concept of issue-ownership to explain why opposition parties 
have difficulty mobilizing voters with programmatic rhetoric.  West African parties are 
generally young, inexperienced, share similar backgrounds, and generally lack distinct 
constituencies of support, making it difficult for them to draw on reputational 
attachments to specific issues. Therefore, we argue that opposition parties across the 
subregion are most likely to mobilize on similar issues, which are drawn from a common 
vocabulary of democratic politics and are perceived to be “opposition issues.” 
 
The first section of the paper explores the subregion’s political and historical context 
that has shaped the worldview of most opposition parties. The following section 
challenges the notion of African parties as uniquely exotic, clientelist machines that lack 
an interest in issues or substance, by showing that in West Africa, as elsewhere, rhetoric 
and ritual are related to substantive political debate.  It highlights shared norms of 
democratic politics hidden within the rhetoric and ritual of West African politics.  The 
third section adapts the theory of issue ownership from American politics to the context 
of African politics.  Based on our data from francophone West Africa, we classify issues 
as opposition-owned, incumbent-owned, or contentious, in order to explain the 
likelihood that the opposition will engage them.  In the final section, we reflect on the 
possibilities for opposition mobilization along substantive issues and the predicted 
relevance of the theory in other regions of the continent. 
 
The Context of Party Formation in West Africa 
The six countries on which on which we focus share a number of characteristics. They 
share semi-presidential constitutional systems, as well as two round-majority systems 
for the presidency, and all but Mali and Mauritania have a single round voting system 
for legislative elections.  Their experience with democracy is recent and uneven.  
Francophone West African transitions to democracy in the early 1990s began with 
national conferences in Benin, Niger, and Mali in 1991, and the departure of incumbent 
presidents.  In our other countries, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Senegal, incumbents 
clung to power, but governments made significant subsequent democratic adjustments 
to their constitutions.  In all six countries, nonetheless, democratic consolidation 
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remains uncertain; in particular, incumbents continue to derive significant material, 
organizational and legitimacy advantages from controlling the state apparatus.  
 
Political parties in Francophone West Africa have been shaped by five contextual 
factors.  First, although it is possible to discern links to the earlier party systems that 
existed briefly around independence, most contemporary parties emerged in the 
aftermath of democratization in the early 1990s, following several decades of single 
party dominance. As a result, a surprisingly large proportion of the leading opposition 
politicians had previously belonged to the single party, and or served in its governments 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, opposition parties in the sub-region are for the most part 
quite young, and are constituted by similarly socialized politicians.  
 
Second, and relatedly, political parties have been created and managed by educated, 
westernized urban elites. Their political values are typically shaped by those prevailing in 
the donor and NGO community.11 Members of the opposition can be viewed as part of 
an educated, cosmopolitan “classe politique,” with overseas experiences that appear 
distinct from the poor, illiterate, and god-fearing overwhelming majority of citizens.12 
While similar rifts between elite politicians and the masses exist in most countries, low 
levels of urbanization and economic development in the region exacerbate this 
disjuncture.  All six countries have 2009 UNDP Human Development Indicator rankings 
in the bottom quintile – ranging from Mauritania ranked 154th to Niger ranked last of 
182 countries.13
 
 
Third, the countries in the sub-region are characterized by high levels of foreign aid 
dependence.  During the last two decades, Western donors have played an increasingly 
intrusive political and economic role in these regimes, as the emergence of electoral 
politics coincided with donor-supported structural adjustment and privatization 
programs as well as the Millennium Development Campaign to increase access to social 
services and improve human capital.  Typically, well over half of the investment budget 
is provided by foreign aid, while perhaps as much as two thirds of social service 
provision is assured by aid agencies and foreign NGOs.  Inevitably, this aid dependence 
affects the party system.  To be sure, donors have provided direct assistance to 
opposition politicians, in the context of various civic education programs, scholarships, 
study tours of western countries, and various other linkages to western embassies.  But 
in addition, the civil society fabric from which some opposition politicians emerged is 
closely integrated into the aid system. Most major civic associations receive 
international support.  Donors are typically the most important private employer in the 
capital, offering among the best remunerated positions available to many of the most 
highly educated local professionals. 
 
                                                 
11 Daloz, Le (Non-) Renouvellement Des Elites en Afrique Subsaharienne  
12 Sears, Deepening Democracy;  Idrissa, The Invention of Order; Villalon and Idrissa, 2005;  
13 http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Summary.pdf 
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Fourth, political parties are shaped by the sub-region’s common Franco-phone heritage.  
In particular, political elites share a strong common secular tradition, which associates 
modernity with a secular public sphere. The banning of religious and ethnic parties in all 
six countries is one direct result of this heritage.14 Religious interest groups that have 
attempted to integrate Islam into national institutions and legalize religious political 
parties have consistently been defeated by a remarkably united political class.15  Despite 
being an avowedly theocratic state, Mauritania did not allow Islamic parties to register 
in 1991, and the reformist Party for Democratic Convergence (PCD) was not allowed in 
2004 or 2005.  In Senegal, where the Mourides have long enjoyed real political 
influence, some political parties are led by Imams (for instance, the Imam Mbaye Niang, 
Member of Parliament and Secretary General of MRDS) or by influent members of 
various Islamic Brotherhoods (PVD of Serigne Modou Kara Mbacke, or the MRS of 
Serigne Moustapha Sy, and FAP of Ahmed Khalifa Niasse). However, the participation of 
imams in political parties is quickly criticized by the press and other parties, as divisive 
and a threat to the secular nature of the state.  Some opposition parties have opposed 
what they view as President Wade’s willingness to subvert the secular tradition of the 
state and grant growing political influence to the Mourides.16
 
 
These countries also share legal restrictions on other “particularistic” parties (ethnic or 
regional), given the longstanding fear that electoral politics might exacerbate these 
cultural divisions and lead to political instability and violence.17   The degree to which 
these rules have been prohibitive varies:   Burkina Faso, Niger Mali, and Senegal boast 
much weaker ethnic and regional party cleavages than other countries in Africa.18
 
 
However, Benin and Mauritania each have opposition parties with clear regional or 
ethnic characteristics.  
Finally, an important fifth factor that shapes the political rhetoric and strategies of 
political parties in the sub region is their general lack of popularity and low legitimacy, a 
striking finding of attitudinal surveys such as the Afrobarometer,19in which citizens have 
expressed distrust of political parties, and their strong preference for consensual politics 
over partisanship.20
                                                 
14 Bogaards, ‘Electoral Systems’   
 Perhaps these citizens have not yet become accustomed to partisan 
debate, given the rhetorical emphasis on national unity and consensus during the long 
era of the single party.  In any event, this popular attitude puts added pressure on the 
opposition, since the incumbent party escapes the worst of this popular censure, in part 
because people associate it with the government and imbues it with the legitimacy of 
the state.  Incumbents in the region understand this.  Politicians including Yayi Boni in 
15 Villalon and Idrissa, ‘Repetitive Breakdowns and a Decade of Experimentation’, 32 
16 ‘Les Assises du Sénégal’  (http://www.assises-senegal.info) 
17 Bogaards, ‘Electoral Systems’; Glickman, Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa   
18 Dunning and Harrison, ‘Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting’; Villalon and Idrissa, ‘Repetitive 
Breakdowns’ 
19 Logan, ‘The Trust Gap’; Little and Logan, ‘The Quality of Democracy and Governance in Africa’ 
20 Logan, ‘The Trust Gap,’  Sears, Deepening Democracy;  
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Benin or Amadou Toumani Touré in Mali have won campaigns running as independents 
and advocating national consensus.  Once in power, these same politicians have 
criticized partisanship, as a way to manage opposition.  Thus, it seems plausible that 
opposition parties engage in at least some self-censorship in their rhetoric. 
  
We argue that these five factors shape the world view and discourse of politicians in the 
region. It has served to stabilize democratic politics, which is now widely perceived as 
the only legitimate form of governance among these elites.21
 
 More importantly, this 
historical context helped shape a hegemony of ideas about “democratic politics” that 
continues to shape parties’ agendas, and restricts the choice-set of political issues that 
dominate the rhetoric of parties in recent elections.  As argued below, these factors also 
help to explain the inattention of opposition parties to the pressing concerns of non-
elites.  Opposition politics has constituted a game played by secular elites who were 
tasked with balancing populations’ urgent demands for development with meager 
national budgets and the concerns of donors, challenging incumbents’ grasp on power 
without dividing the population, and attracting aid to help fund development projects.  
Rhetoric and Ritual in West African Elections 
Political rhetoric and ritual in the African context is often portrayed as unimaginative, 
non-programmatic, and largely focused on fueling clientelist relationships.  Clearly, few 
African elections have included sophisticated debates about macro-economic policy or 
education.  it is often difficult to discern the substantive policy relevance of such rituals 
of West African elections such as politicians sponsoring soccer games, or the distribution 
of bags of rice or t-shirts at rallies at which there is very little discussion of the party’s 
policy platform.     
 
However, West African politics should not be held to an unrealistic standard. Empty 
rhetoric and populist ritual is common across all democracies.  In the US, observers note 
the posturing by American politicians regarding their unbridled patriotism (in the 2008 
election, candidate Obama’s initial reluctance to wear a flag pin on his lapel was 
criticized as suggestive of his inadequate patriotism), or their attachment to family 
values and the rural way of life. Visiting county fairs, eating regional specialties and 
praising the quality of the local livestock is an inevitable ritual for most national 
politicians running for office in the OECD. The ritual is viewed as a way for politicians 
and parties to signal both their recognition of the political power and legitimacy of rural 
interests, and their support of a policy agenda that will support these rural interests.  
Rhetoric and ritual do not preclude a substantive understanding of political issues, but 
represent instead the idiom of electoral practice, the pre-requisite practices through 
which candidates communicate and appeal to voters, notably about substantive issues.   
 
                                                 
21 Bratton et al, Public Opinion, Market Reform, and Democratization in Africa.; Little and Logan, ‘The 
Quality of Democracy and Governance in Africa’ 
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West African politics parties’ rhetoric and rituals should similarly be understood in the 
context of their own unique political heritage. Much political rhetoric communicates 
politicians’ attachment to the key values of liberal democracy, on the one hand, and 
economic development, on the other.  The political class has built its own identity 
around the concept of the secular, republican state. 22
 
 The recurring rhetorical 
references to democracy reflect both recent democratization, but also the attachment 
of politicians themselves to these institutions.    
In addition, given the rampant poverty in the region, all politicians and party platforms 
must invariably express support for rapid economic development. It is easy to be cynical 
regarding this rhetoric, given the uneven support for economic development by 
successive governments, but the low level of development prevailing in the region and 
the evident wish of most of the voters for more rapid economic progress and poverty 
alleviation probably assures that politicians feel they need to invoke its importance.  As 
a result, most parties in the region have adopted almost identical rhetoric about “good 
governance” and anti-corruption measures as well as justice, liberty, human rights, and 
solidarity.  We argue that politicians adopt this “development speak”, because they 
have internalized a fundamental value of the political system.23
 
  No one can be against 
democracy or fail to support economic development, much in the same manner that all 
American politicians choose to adopt an ostentatious patriotism.  
Political parties rely on rituals, such as two ubiquitous West African electoral staples, the 
pre-election soccer games and the candidate country-side tour, that reflect and evoke 
the central values of democracy and development in the political psyche. The nature of 
these political rituals is often veiled by clientelism, as they create venues for the public 
distribution of patronage, but it is important to recognize their political symbolism as 
well.  Parties stage “youth focused” soccer games to express concern for unemployment 
and the urgency of job creation, education, and greater economic opportunities. These 
issues concern not just young people, but their parents and families, who are 
increasingly concerned about job and education prospects for young people as well as 
the general population who worry about the violent history of youth protests and 
strikes in recent democratic memory.  Soccer games become more than venues to 
distribute money and resources; they are designed to signal the candidates’ 
commitment to eradicating unemployment and providing opportunities to youth.   
 
Most national level candidates similarly embark on a pre-election tour to visit their 
future constituencies, in districts far away from the capital.  Jourde chronicles the role of 
presidential tours in Mauritania as a symbolic broadcasting of power and a co-opting 
theatrical performance, but also as a guarantee to rural populations that the president 
hears their specific grievances.24
                                                 
22 Idrissa, The Invention of Order; Sears, Deepening Democracy 
  The ability to leave the capital to better understand 
23 Bierschenk ‘Democratization without Development,’ 349 
24 ‘The President Is Coming to Visit’ 
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the problems and perspective of the common man is important to rural voters.  
Candidates’ tours emphasize candidates’ willingness to listen to demands of rural 
populations, but also speak to the larger problem of infrastructure.  As a candidate 
embarks on a tour to a remote region, traveling the same lousy roads on which rural 
populations depend provides a way to demonstrate solidarity with the local 
populations. Despite the tremendous expense and time involved, presidential 
candidates all undertake such extensive tours, which appear essential to political 
legitimacy.25
 
  
Issue Ownership in the West African Context 
First introduced by John Petrocik, the theory of “issue ownership” posits that parties will 
focus on issues that they “own,” because they have greater credibility as being able to 
manage and resolve these issues. Parties earn reputations as “owners” of issues over 
time as parties and candidates’ performances on issues is tested.  In American politics, 
parties have “sociologically distinctive constituencies” and the “linkage between a 
party’s issue agenda, and the social characteristics of its supporters is quite 
strong.”26This connection creates a reciprocal effect in which segments of society 
support parties to promote or protect their interest, while parties advertise these 
policies to draw supporters form these communities.  Parties’ attempts at promoting 
policies in an issue space claimed by another party are eclipsed by the voters’ 
perceptions of parties’ reputational issue areas.27
 
 
African political parties face multiple challenges to earning reputations as “issue 
owners.” Most African parties are less than two decades old and have actually 
competed only in a small number of electoral campaigns.  In addition, political actors 
share a profile, as urban, educated, Francophone elites, distinct from the rest of the 
population, which makes it difficult for them to bring specific issue identities to their 
parties.   Lastly, low-income countries of West Africa lack similar structural cleavages 
one finds in Western Europe, and which have influenced party formation around the 
world.  One sense in which this is clearly true is the size of the working class, at least in 
its classic sense of unionized low income workers in manufacturing and mining 
industries, which made the electoral fortunes of the Labor Party in Great Britain, or the 
Social Democratic Parties in northern Europe.  In French West Africa, with its tiny 
manufacturing sector and capital intensive mining sector, the potential for working class 
mass parties is low.  There is a somewhat larger potential in the white collar public 
sector, -though these groups represent a miniscule proportion of the labor force, and 
they have been tightly controlled and or repressed by the state, remaining weakly 
organized.  The absence of strong parties representing class interests in French West 
                                                 
25Young finds that constituency visits, not private goods, help re-election bids in Zambia and Kenya. 
‘Is Clientalism at Work’ 
26 Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen, ‘Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning,’601; Petrocik, John, 
‘Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections,’ 828. 
27Norpoth and Buchanan. ‘Wanted’ 
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Africa can be related to these economic structural differences.  The exception to this 
dilemma may be candidates’ abilities to draw on their own regional, ethnic, or 
professional identities to attract bloc constituencies.28
 
  While restrictions on the use of 
regional or ethnic associations limit parties’ abilities to identify as proponents of 
particular constituencies, parties in Benin, and Mauritania have resorted to ethno-
regional electoral appeals.   
We identify several clear and predictable patterns in the ownership of political issues in 
West Africa.  We distinguish between issues owned by opposition parties and 
incumbents, before turning our attention to contentious issues, which we define as 
issues that resonate with citizens, but falls outside of the realm of imagined politics or 
are risky for elite actors to pursue, and thus are poorly captured by political parties. 
Below we illustrate our arguments with examples of each type of issue category. 
 
Opposition Issues 
Opposition parties share a conception of what it means to be in the opposition; parties 
can activate a common vocabulary of democratic politics and claim agendas and issues 
that reflect their imagined roles as the opposition, in the historical and social context of 
West Africa.  Opposition parties can offer more credible critiques of incumbent 
corruption or mismanagement and abuse of constitutional power.  As mentioned above, 
opposition parties can draw on ethnic identities to address minority grievances.  We 
argue that opposition parties will be more likely to embrace “opposition issues” than 
“incumbent’s issues” because they have greater credibility with these issues.  
 
Executive Abuses of Power: Opposition parties, particularly in Mauritania, Senegal, and 
Niger, focus their discourse on constitutional issues; term limits and other basic “rules of 
the game” are prominent issues.  This reflects the newness of the current regime and 
the authoritarian legacy, as the incumbent continues to enjoy inordinate political 
advantages in each of these countries.  The rules of democracy appear to have been 
largely internalized by the citizenry, and opposition complaints about the unfairness of 
the rule of the game find a receptive audience.  
 
In Senegal, President Wade has sought to strengthen his political power by engineering 
reforms of the constitution, much to the annoyance of opposition groups. 29
                                                 
28 Gazibo, Pour une réhabilitation de l’analyse des partis en Afrique  
 In 
anticipation of the 2012 Presidential elections, opposition parties created a coalition to 
publicize the unfairness of the various incumbency advantages that President Wade 
exploited.  The charges have helped the opposition group to gain traction; in the 2009 
elections, they won all the major mayoralties in Senegal except for the Casamance 
region.  In Mauritania, opposition parties formed a coalition to protest the 2008 coup 
and to boycott the June 2009 elections.  The movement gained the support of 
international actors, which were able to negotiate postponement of the 2009 
29 Thiam, ‘Une Constitution’   
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elections. 30
 
  In Niger, opposition parties and civil society groups created another 
coalition to organize popular rallies to protest President Tandja’s constitutional “coup 
d’état.” 
In Burkina Faso, opposition parties united in response to the 1998 murder o journalist 
Norbert Zongo who was killed while investigating criminal allegations against the 
president’s brother; they continue to invoke this case for legitimacy. Similarly, 
opposition groups have rallied around repressive crackdowns on protests, perceived 
abuses or citizens, and other violent abuses of power. 
 
Corruption: Opposition accusations of the squandering of national budgets and citizens’ 
tax revenue through government incompetence and venality find such a receptive 
audience that is unsurprising that opposition parties regularly base their campaigns on 
fights against corruption.  The 2004 Pakistani Rice Affair, in which Pakistan gave rice to 
the government of Niger to sell to create capital for a joint development project, 
provides an example of these dynamics.  The opposition publicized that many of the 
ministers and MPs pocketed the rice and the profit and president was forced to make 
many high-ranking officials return the stolen money.  As a result some incumbent 
deputies including the Secretary General of the ruling party were defeated.31
 
  
In a recent scandal, the opposition publicized President Wade’s gift of a suitcase full of 
money to a departing IMF official. While Wade insists this is a local tradition, the 
opposition trumpeted the issue to highlight its argument of venality at the core of the 
Wade administration, drawing favorable media coverage.    
 
Minority Rights: In Mauritania , Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, leader of the People’s 
Progressive Alliance, is the son of former slaves.  He ran on human rights, eventually 
becoming the president of the national assembly with backing from Mauritanians 
typically excluded from politics. In Benin, each of the four main parties draw heavily on 
regional constituencies. Though not a formal political party, Northern nomadic groups 
created the Nigerien Movement for Justice, which blogs about the struggle for greater 
percentages of uranium revenues to be reinvested in the uranium-producing region.32
 
 
We anticipate that opposition parties are most likely to mobilize along opposition issues 
because they can credibly sell themselves as the entities best suited to tackle these 
particular issues.  Incumbent parties cannot make credible claims to oust corruption or 
executive abuse of power in systems dominated by their own parties. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Ciavolella et Fresia, ‘Mauritanie, la démocratie, au coup par coup’ 
31 Gazibo, ‘Niger’s 2004 Presidential Elections’.  
32 http://m-n-j.blogspot.com/ 
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 Incumbent-owned issues:   
The last two decades of experimenting with democracy has also generated a series of 
issues that are clearly advantageous to incumbents.  Since they manage state resources 
and diplomatic connections they refer to economic development or foreign relations 
with authority.  For their part, opposition candidates lack credibility to speak about 
development projects or foreign relations because their capacity in these realms 
remains untested, and so unsurprisingly, their political rhetoric tends to eschew these 
themes.  
 
National Security: Incumbents often extol the importance of their leadership in response 
to security threats.  In the Sahelian region, these threats have garnered the attention of 
a dual audience: domestic constituencies as well as a Western audience eager to find 
allies in the broader “war on terror” as well as centers of stability in a volatile region. In 
Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, attacks on military installations and the kidnapping of 
Westerners as well as bombings in Mauritania in the wake of 9-11, have heightened 
domestic and international fears of fundamentalist terrorism.  These concerns have 
helped spur the US government to invest over $500 million in the region, to provide 
training for host country militaries so that they could better police the desert.   
 
Governments have framed domestic instability in the more global context of the “war 
on terror” to fundraise for their national budgets, but also to underscore their 
indispensable roles in ensuring national stability.  In Mauritania, President Taya and 
President Aziz have both tried to raise public fear of foreign extremists making their way 
into the government.33
 
   
We observe a related phenomenon in response to the threat of regional insecurity. As 
thousands of Burkinabe fled the war in Cote d’Ivoire, President Compaoré fostered an 
image as a “defender of national interest,” which helped to earn an 80% victory in his 
controversial third term elections.34
 
In this case as well, incumbents find national 
security rhetoric to be an ideal way in which to appear statesman-like and above the 
partisan fray. 
Development: Incumbents’ access to government rents and international donors also 
adds to their credibility to their reputation around development issues.   These West 
African economies have grown over the last ten years, and elected officials are eager to 
acknowledge the progress as their own.  Reelection campaign slogans throughout the 
region often ask voters to allow incumbents to “finish the work they started.”  Niger’s 
president Tandja used this rationale as a justification for his referendum to hold onto 
power, beyond his allotted two terms.  Similarly, in their re-election campaigns 
                                                 
33 Ciavello and Fresia, ‘Entre Démocratisation et coups d’état’,’10; Jourde, ‘Constructing 
Representations of the ‘Global War on Terror’’ 
34 Democratic Coalition Project, ‘Burkina Faso 
(http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/6_Burkina_Faso.pdf). 
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Presidents Wade, ATT, and Compaoré talked about wanting to address the remaining 
economic challenges with the vigor they have attacked poverty in their first terms. 
An exception to this incumbent stranglehold over development or security issues comes 
when the personal biography of an opposition leader demonstrates expertise in 
particular issue area.  As leaders of the opposition, Wade and Konare used their 
experience as teachers to mobilize student voters  in the 1990s.  In 2006, political 
neophyte Yayi Boni was elected President of Benin.  Boni, who holds a PhD in 
Economics, was able to defeat a political insider by running a campaign focused on 
economic reform. Of course, this personalization of party platforms points to the 
weakness of political parties – especially when people like Boni chose to run as 
independents, but this strategy may offer an entry point for parties to build subsequent 
issue reputations.   
 
 
Contentious Issues 
We define contentious issues as those that resonate deeply with citizens, but are largely 
unclaimed by either the opposition or the incumbent parties because they fall outside of 
the realm of imagined politics of westernized elites, or are viewed as risky for elite 
actors to pursue given the views of the donor community; as a result, these issues have 
been poorly captured by political parties.  
 
Islam, traditional authority, and the family:  Negotiation between the secular state and 
societies that are 90% Muslim has been complex, not least because of a relative 
strengthening of Islamic faith and public presence in recent years.35
 
 While political 
parties tend to exclude themselves from these conversations or join them very gingerly, 
both religious associations and rights-based organizations have eagerly entered the fray, 
suggesting that citizens are passionate about these issues. 
Politicians in the region use their “Muslim” identity on as a reputation-building tool, but 
rarely does it align with policy concerns. Parties fail to capture the preferences of 
millions of citizens for a lower marriage age or the legalization of religious marriage. Our 
earlier anecdote demonstrated popular resistance to the passage of the Family Code – 
which has proved to be one of the most contentious and debated political issues in the 
region. Women’s associations and religious groups have also exchanged in a vociferous 
debate about the code in Senegal, Benin, and Niger.36
 
  
The absence of political parties from debates about the code remains striking.  Donor 
and NGO circles have been surprised by the depth and intensity of the opposition to the 
proposed family code, which they sometimes deride as obscurantist.  Resistance to the 
code, though often shrouded in religious language, embodies a larger political struggle 
between the state and traditional practices. For example, the most contentious issue in 
                                                 
35 Miles, Political Islam in West Africa;  Villalon, ‘From Argument to Negotiation’ 
36 Wing ‘Women's Rights’  
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the Malian code is the refusal to legalize religious marriage, which has practical 
implications for the many Malians who forgo or delay an ostentatious “mayor’s 
wedding” due to the prohibitive costs and the clerics who perform these ceremonies.  In 
sum, the proposed changes are widely viewed unsympathetic to the realities of Malian 
society. 
  
The Role of the State in the Economy:  The proper role of the state in the economy is 
another recurring issue in Francophone West Africa that often proves problematic for 
parties.  Popular debates about the privatization of nationalized industries in all the 
countries of the region have, for instance, been heated within civil society, and yet little 
debated within the national legislatures.  The privatization of the Mali-Senegal rail line 
in 2003 incited public protest in both Mali and Senegal. The new owners limited 
passenger service, cut wages and jobs, and attempted to curb union activity.37
 
 As 
ownership of the Transrail passed through different hands, the railway has severely 
degraded; following a series of derailments in spring 2009, Transrail ended passenger 
service from Bamako to Dakar. 
Only after Senegalese unions publicized the government’s weakness in the face of 
Transrail did political parties incorporate railway development plans in their platforms.38 
In Mali, concerned citizens formed an association, Cocidirail, but had little success 
attracting the ears of political parties.  Led by Dr. Tiecoura Traore, who was fired from 
his job after his vocal opposition to privatization, Cocidirail collected petitions calling for 
re-nationalization, led protests, and conducted radio sensitization campaigns without 
gaining the audience of political parties or state officials.39
 
  Given the legacy of activism 
and politics along the rail and the near complete electoral defeat of incumbent deputies 
from constituencies along the railroad in 2007, it is striking that political parties would 
not tap into this movement. 
More generally, the Transrail experience in Mali and Senegal has tainted the public’s 
opinion of “privatization.”40  Its unpopularity has helped slow down the privatization of 
other Malian para-statals, including the national cotton company (CMDT).  With the 
exception of marginal opposition parties, most political parties have remained silent on 
this issue.  In 2003, the presidents of Mali and Burkina Faso wrote a New York Times 
editorial on the plight of African farmers competing against of Western agricultural 
subsidies; they joined the government of Benin to lobby the World Trade Organization 
to form a subcommittee on the issue.41
                                                 
37 Munié, ‘The Slow Train to Senegal’   
  Despite being the importance of the sector to 
citizens’ livelihoods, most political parties have not presented policy positions or 
prescriptions for the ailing sector. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Bleck Interview with Tiecoura Traore, November 2009 
40 Privatization battles with the World Bank were further publicized in the Sissako’s 2007 film 
“Bamako” 
41 ‘Your Farm Subsidies Are Strangling Us,’ New York Times: July 11, 2003 (17). 
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A related issue that arouses a similar sense of economic nationalism in the public 
concerns the management of natural resources.  Debate in Mauritania has focused on 
EU fishing in Mauritanian waters, while a debate in Niger has focused on the 
appropriate management of uranium resources (a major grievance of Tuareg rebels) and 
now of oil extraction; in Mali, a longstanding grassroots movement has questioned the 
nature of the management of the gold mining sector.  Again, however, most political 
party rhetoric fails to address these issues in a concrete way in recent elections.  
 
Immigration:  Immigration is similarly hotly debated in the local press as thousands of 
young people from the region migrate looking for a better economic future.  NGOs 
create projects and hold conferences to address the root causes of immigration; rappers 
sing about undocumented immigrants’ plights, but political parties have been slow to 
embrace questions of immigration policy and the rights for undocumented nationals 
abroad in Europe and the United States.  Parties talk about communities abroad in 
vague terms of solidarity with “returned sons,” but rarely take a stand on immigration 
policy. 
 
The number of readmission treaties between West African and recipient countries have 
steadily grown over the last decade.  As executives attempt to gently negotiate 
immigration policy, opposition parties miss an opportunity to publicize alternative policy 
positions.  Remittance flows are critically important to the economies of Senegal and 
Mali; it is surprising that a political party does not emerge with a stronger stance on 
readmission treaties or treatment of citizens living abroad. 
 
On each of these issues, parties have taken a back seat to civil society actors.  Why have 
parties not tried to own these issues?  We hypothesize that political parties have failed 
to comprehend the potential electoral benefits from mobilizing voters on these issues 
largely because the values and concerns of westernized elites permeate the leaderships 
of the major political parties, and they have largely adopted the world view of the donor 
and NGO community, for whom these issues elicit little controversy 
 
Possibilities for Political issues in Africa   
We have offered a tentative explanation for the puzzling pusillanimity of parties 
regarding issues for which a more proactive stance could be assumed to have reaped 
electoral dividends.  Legal restrictions probably partly hamper the emergence of more 
trenchant party rhetoric regarding Islamic issues, but no such restrictions exist for 
economic policy issues, for instance, other than those that are self-imposed. The 
primary obstacle for opposition parties is their inexperience, similar backgrounds, and 
undefined constituencies, which make it difficult for parties to create unique identities 
as “issue owners.” This offers hope for the evolution of parties in Africa.  The discussion 
of certain contentious issues, such as privatization and traditional values, may require 
the immergence of political actors from different backgrounds with non-Western 
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backing.  On other issues, future elections may provide parties with more experience 
with which to create reputations on substantive issues. 
 
Issue ownership is hardly static and unchanging, and in this section we want to briefly 
hypothesize about the sources of variation, both across countries and across time.  First, 
the countries on which this article has focused share a relatively low level of economic 
development, with very low levels of national income, low levels of human 
development, high aid-dependence, and large proportions of rural populations. Even in 
the context of West Africa, they may prove to be laggards in the process of issue 
ownership and party institutionalization.  For instance, the party system in Ghana 
appears to be institutionalizing faster than those analyzed in this paper, and observers 
applauded the emergence of substantive discussions of policy issues, including the first-
ever televised presidential debates, during the 2008 election in Ghana.42
 
Future research 
should explore cross-national variation. The experience of multi-party electoral politics 
in Francophone West Africa is recent, with the partial exception of Senegal. In older 
political systems, the process of party institutionalization may be further along, and with 
it the dynamics of issue ownership different than those described here.  In richer, bigger 
economic systems, the weight of the donors is likely to be less significant.  
The fledgling nature of party politics in the region suggests that patterns are not fully 
set.  As parties gain experience and as elections bring about alternation, they are likely 
to establish reputations regarding issues, changing the current patterns of issue 
ownership. This process will vary across the countries in our sample, even holding 
structural factors constant, as a function of contingent factors such as the differences in 
electoral results, the quality of candidates, and the organizational skills of individual 
parties. 
 
Lastly, by studying predominantly Muslim countries with Francophone institutional and 
secularist legacies, we fail to engage with important questions about the intersection 
between Christianity and political parties, which are likely to be significant in other parts 
of the African continent.  The organizational resources of the different Christian 
churches, as well as their role in various social services, predispose them to a larger 
political role.   Moreover, our hypotheses suggests that identities around regional, 
ethnic, or religious issues may be the easiest for parties to cultivate in the short term, as 
long as these issues do not conflict with electoral laws or predominant “elite culture.” 
Given the short life span of most political parties in Africa, it is unsurprising that 
opposition parties turn to particularistic identities because they are the easiest to own.  
This does not preclude possibilities for building reputations on substantive issues over 
time.   
                                                 
42 “Ghana’s Historic Presidential Debates”: http://www.cipe.org/blog/?p=1274 
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